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WHERE ARE YOU GOING, WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN? 
SERIOUSLY, LET ME SEE YOUR GPS. 
 




Technological advances continue to confound already dense fourth 
amendment jurisprudence. As modern devices become more powerful, the 
information stored and accessed within raises new issues that did not exist 
only a few decades ago. As such, new technological devices have the 
potential to create cases of first impression upon the courts. Recently, 
in U.S. v. Alvarez, Judge McAvoy ruled warrantless searches of cell phones 
unconstitutional in the absence of exigent circumstances or a need to protect 
officer safety.1 The opinion compared cell phones to modern computers2 
that house a wealth of private information within3 (akin to personal 
                                                
* Rajendra Persaud is a 3L at Hofstra School of Law. He would like to thank Alafair 
Burke, criminal law professor, for guidance throughout writing this piece and also Toni 
Aiello, reference librarian, for her input and assistance. Both were instrumental in 
commenting on earlier drafts. He can be reached at rpersa13@pride.hofstra.edu. 
1 United States v. Alvarez, 8:13-cr-009 (N.D.N.Y. 2014), available at 
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/022514mcavoy.pdf; see also Joel 




2 Alvarez, supra note 2, at 8-9; for a discussion of the characterization of hard drives, 
cell phones, and other storage mediums as separate subcontainers requiring justification for 
official examination see Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112 (2011), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=bjcl. 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that computers are heavily relied upon for both personal and business use because of 
capabilities in storing personal letters, e-mails, financial information, passwords, family 
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residences4). Thus, the smart phones were granted protection similar to 
computer hard drives5 and all information obtained from the seized phones 
was suppressed.6 
The court declined to extend this reasoning to the seized GPS device, 
instead comparing it to a paper map7 despite the latter’s primitive nature. 
The court distinguished the GPS device by reasoning that the device’s 
function was designed to guide a person on a trip, the information contained 
was easily available to the public, and the seizure was connected to the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion about the defendants’ presence in the area.8 
This comment addresses the oversight regarding the technological 
capability of the GPS device and considers implications in light of future 
litigation. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND OF ALVAREZ 
 
Border Patrol agents observed a suspicious person standing near a 
convenience store entrance in Ellenburg, New York (near the Canadian 
border).9 Upon questioning, the individual revealed that he was a citizen of 
Cuba and not lawfully in the United States.10 He stated that he ventured 
across the border on foot.11 At the Border Patrol Station, the individual 
indicated that his girlfriend was scheduled to escort him to Florida in a red 
Honda.12 Later, the Border Patrol agents searched the area for the Honda 
and found it driven by two Hispanic females in the parking lot of the same 
convenience store.13 After briefly speaking with the women, the agents 
requested their presence at the Border Patrol station for further 
questioning.14 The initial suspect, already in custody at the station, indicated 
that he knew the two women and that one was, in fact, his girlfriend.15 
Without consent or warrant, an agent searched a seized cell phone to 
                                                                                                                       
photos, and numerous other personal items in electronic form). 
4 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to 
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm 
line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”) (emphasis added). 
5 Alvarez, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
6 Id. at 18-19. 
7 Id. at 10. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 1-2. 




14 Id. at 3. 
15 Id. at 4. 
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allegedly obtain information on the charge of alien smuggling, before 
examining the vehicle’s GPS device to determine what addresses were 
recently entered into the device (a Miami, Florida address was listed as 
“Home”).16 Both women were placed under arrest after interrogation.17 
 
II.  WARRANTLESS SEARCH JURISPRUDENTIAL OVERVIEW18 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, 
requiring a warrant based upon probable cause.19 Courts consistently hold 
that determining what qualifies as a search entails a “twofold requirement, 
first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”20 
Searches conducted without warrant or consent are unreasonable per 
se under the Fourth Amendment with the exceptions of a few specific 
doctrines.21 A search incident to arrest is permissible without a warrant or 
consent if an officer shows that the purpose of the search is to prevent the 
destruction of evidence or safeguard an officer from harm.22 Brief, in-
person detentions are permissible under certain circumstances. “Stop and 
Frisk” includes a stop to detect and prevent crime, and frisk (external pat 
down) to guard against concealed weapons or other potential harms that 
                                                
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 For a comprehensive overview of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Thomas K. 
Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 
1006 (2004). 
19 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”); see U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (“the central concern of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by government officials”); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 
(1983) (“The threshold question, then, is whether an individual has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the contents of a previously lawfully searched container”); see 
generally United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (discussing that a vehicle is 
considered an “effect” for fourth amendment considerations and is subject to the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness). 
20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., 
Minn. v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 109 (1998); State v. Peterson, 173 Ohio App. 3d 575, 2007-
Ohio-5667, 879 N.E.2d 806, at ¶ 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); United States v. Taborda, 635 
F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980); State v. Chort, 577 P.2d 892, 893 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); 
People v. Becker, 533 P.2d 494, 495 (Colo. 1975). 
21 Id. at 357. 
22 Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752, 736 (1969). 
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place an officer’s safety at risk.23 Evidence in “plain view” may be seized 
by officers who are already lawfully located on a particular premises, even 
if the newly discovered evidence is absent from the search warrant.24 
Certain containers, as small as cigarette packages, can be examined during a 
search incident to arrest even if the officer is not specifically suspicious that 
the contents contained within are illegal, as long as the search is not 
conducted in an abusive or extreme manner.25 An officer may search a 
vehicle’s passenger compartment even if no contact is made with the 
arrestee until after the suspect has left vehicle, so long as the arrestee was a 
“recent occupant” of that vehicle.26 
To illustrate the expansion of the fourth amendment line of cases, 
consider a recent Supreme Court ruling. In Riley, the defendant was stopped 
by a police officer for driving with expired registration tags.27 After 
learning that Riley’s license was suspended, the officer impounded Riley’s 
car.28 An officer retrieved a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket during a 
search incident to arrest.29 At the police station about two hours after the 
arrest, a detective specializing in gangs searched the phone for evidence of 
gang activity.30 The Court took a reasonableness approach to examine the 
warrantless search.31 The Court considered prior justifications for 
warrantless searches, finding that they were inapplicable. “Digital data 
stored on a cellphone cannot itself be used to harm an arresting officer or 
effectuate an arrestee’s escape.”32 While police officers can examine the 
physical exterior of the phone for harmful weapons, like a hidden razor 
blade, an officer may not cite physical danger as an excuse for the 
warrantless search of a cell phone once the phone has been secured and any 
potential physical threats has been eliminated.33 Likewise, preventing the 
destruction of evidence was inapplicable because remote wiping and data 
encryption were not among the officers’ suspicions.34 Remote wiping 
occurs when a phone receives a signal that erases stored data and data 
encryption occurs when a password is enabled on the device.35 The Court 
                                                
23 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 23, 29 (1968). 
24 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403, U.S. 443, 464–71 (1971). 
25 U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
26 Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
27 Riley v. Cal., 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 2481. 
31 Id. at 2482. 
32 Id. at 2485. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 2486. 
35 Id. 
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held that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a cell 
phone search.36 
 
III.  EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE GPS DEVICE 
 
The owner of a GPS device has an objective reasonable expectation of 
privacy because one expects others will not use the device unless 
authorized,37 which represents the hallmark of the right to be let alone.38 
The owner’s authorization typically requires either express consent by the 
owner or an implied understanding that the passenger is assuming a 
navigational role in charting a new course for the vehicle. By its nature, the 
GPS device is not used for purposes other than navigation.39 
Similarly, the owner has a subjective expectation of privacy in assuming 
an officer will not remove the device from its location in the vehicle, turn it 
on, and rummage through its contents without consent or a warrant.40 
In Alvarez, Judge McAvoy ruled against the defendants’ attempt to suppress 
                                                
36 Id. at 2485. 
37 See State v. Rupnick, 125 P.3d 541, 559 (2005) (justifying the Fourth Amendment 
requirement of a warrant to search a computer’s contents premised on a computer owner’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information stored within the hard 
drive); cf. People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 881 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 2013) (“People are not 
so oblivious that they are not aware that cell phones purchased today come with GPS 
technology which can pinpoint the location of the phone at any given time so long as it is 
turned on and the GPS technology has not been deactivated or disabled. That technology 
also enables a person to be mobile and have constant access to and use of his cell phone. 
By a person’s voluntary utilization, through GPS technology, of a cell phone, a person 
necessarily has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the phone’s location—
vis a vis the pinging—even though he maintains what may be a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the content of his phone conversations.”); but see United States v. Skinner, 690 
F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a suspect had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the data given off by his voluntarily procured prepaid cell phone by positing that 
if a tool used to transport contraband emits a traceable signal, then police may track it). 
38 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men”). 
39 See ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41663, LAW ENFORCEMENT USE 
OF GLOBAL POSITIONING (GPS) DEVICES TO MONITOR MOTOR VEHICLES: FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS, “SUMMARY” (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41663.pdf (describing functional capabilities of GPS 
devices). 
40 See State v. Granville, PD-1095-12, 2014 WL 714730, at *3 n.16-17 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Feb. 26, 2014) (“Courts have held that (1) a person has a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his cell phone, and (2) this expectation of privacy is one that 
society recognizes as reasonable and legitimate”), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/02/27/granville_majority.pdf. 
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information located within a GPS device.41 In so ruling, the Judge compared 
the information available within the GPS device to information available in 
a paper map in the front seat of a car.42 In stark contrast to this reasoning, a 
GPS device is actually the functional equivalent to a limited subject matter 
hard drive, conveying specific geographical information via satellite. 
GPS devices provide technological support far beyond that which any 
paper map can provide. The words behind the acronym GPS are “Global 
Positioning System,”43 which reflects the device’s capability to triangulate 
positions using satellites.44 GPS devices are far more intricate than paper 
maps because a GPS device user need only push a button to determine his 
or her place in the world or create a complex route to a new 
destination.45 GPS devices employ real-time technology to track the 
vehicle’s location in relation to its destination.46 This technology enables 
the device to reroute a driver who has gone awry and provide proximal 
destinations according to the driver’s actual location and intended 
destination. These features illustrate the wide array of uses available 
through most GPS devices, but not paper maps. 
Unlike traditional maps, GPS devices are capable of geographical 
triangulation and storing previous locations for future access.47 This storage 
capacity creates a log of the driver’s whereabouts otherwise unavailable if 
one were consulting a paper map. The paper map comparison is tenuous 
because modern GPS devices harness satellite technology in a manner maps 
are not designed to and cannot be capable of utilizing. 
The owner of a GPS device possesses a privacy interest in the device 
and its contents. Cell phones contain sensitive information, ranging from 
stored financial data to revealing photographs.48 The Court should consider 
                                                
41 Stashenko, supra note 2. 
42 Alvarez, supra note 2, at 10. 
43 Guochang Xu, GPS Theory, Algorithms, and Applications 1 (Springer, 2nd ed. 
2007), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=peYFZ69HqEsC&printsec= 
frontcover&dq=gps&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-z8SU5ylBYyM1AG8vYHoBw&ved=0CD4Q6A 
EwAA – v=onepage&q=gps&f=false. 
44 JAMES R. SCHLESINGER & ROBERT J. HERMANN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK 
FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 25-26 (Dept. Def. 
2005), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA443573.pdf. 
45 Xu, supra note 44, at 1. 
46 Space satellites are used as reference points to locate positions on Earth; a vehicle’s 
distance from a satellite is measured in radio waves to calculate time and then multiplied 
by the speed of light to obtain distance. See Washington State Department of Ecology, 
Using Global Positioning Systems (GPS): How it Works, Limitations, and Some 
Guidelines for Operation 3-5 (2001), available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ 
ecy/publications/publications/0006015.pdf. 
47 Daniels, supra note 47, at 3; Bogens, supra note 47, at 5.3-5.8. 
48 Adam Levin, The 10 Dumbest Risks People Take with their Smartphones, 
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that similarly sensitive information is included in a GPS device, although 
limited to geographical data, including home addresses, addresses of 
friends, businesses, acquaintances, and family members, and other private 
destinations. A person that does not consent to a search should be protected 
from an unreasonable invasion of privacy in his or her GPS device. Like a 
hard drive, the GPS device stores a wealth of information regarding where 
the individual has previously traveled to,49 where the individual now is, and 
even maintains the potential for conveying where the individual plans to 
travel. The significant difference between a cell phone and GPS device is 
simply that GPS devices are limited to geographical information. Both 
devices possess sensitive and personal information that should be afforded 
privacy protection. The scope of information available in a computer or cell 
phone hard drive is wide-ranging,50 while the GPS device is limited to 
geographic information either entered by the user or suggested by the 
device itself. While the implications appear lesser in the GPS context 
because the information available is limited to geographical substance, the 
evidence obtained could be proof of criminal culpability and should be 
treated with this concern in mind.51 
 
IV.  PLAIN VIEW 
 
The plain view doctrine permits a law enforcement officer to seize 
evidence beyond the scope of the warrant when criminality is immediately 
apparent and where the search and seizure does not invade privacy.52 The 
                                                                                                                       
CREDIT.COM (Nov. 25, 2014 7:39 PM), http://blog.credit.com/2013/01/the-10-dumbest-
risks-people-take-on-their-smartphones-64384/. 
49 The ability to store locations within the GPS device is a common feature amongst 
many GPS devices on the market today. See, e.g., SONY, Nav-U Instruction Manual 15 
(2008), available at https://docs.sony.com/release/NVU73T_83T_EN.pdf. 
50 See United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The potential for 
privacy violations occasioned by an unbridled, exploratory search of a hard drive is 
enormous. This threat is compounded by the nature of digital storage.”). 
51 “A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a 
turntable.” Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (emphasis added); see also U.S. v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) (“A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial 
invasion of privacy.”). 
52 United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1992); Horton v. California, 496 
U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (“The “plain-view” doctrine is often considered an exception to the 
general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this 
characterization overlooks the important difference between searches and seizures. If an 
article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any 
invasion of privacy”); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 723 (1992) (“A plain view 
seizure of incriminating evidence is sustainable if (i) the police officer is lawfully located 
in a place from which the item can plainly be seen; (ii) the officer has a lawful right of 
access to the item itself; and (iii) it is “immediately apparent” that the seized item is 
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plain view doctrine should not apply to GPS devices. 
A GPS device, like any hard drive, conveys no detail of criminality in 
plain view. Unlike a cell phone, which may convey basic information from 
the home screen or the phone case,53 accessing a GPS log requires 
manipulation of the device. When powered on, the device has the potential 
to display where the user is traveling to and where the user actually is 
located. When powered off, the device is clearly not helpful. 
Rather, discovering anything useful to establish culpability requires 
something more.54 In the hard drive context, discovery requires performing 
searches, accessing previously inaccessible files, opening documents, and 
conducting other computer-related inquiries.55 While an officer generally 
has authority to seize incriminating evidence in plain view if he or she has 
prior justification for the intrusion,56 the evidence embedded in the GPS 
device is unknown until the device is powered on and one searches through 
its stored locations (with the singular exception of information displayed by 
the device if it is routing a driver to a specified location). Thus, the listings 
of previously traveled destinations amounting to geographic evidence 
obtained from a GPS device can almost never be discovered inadvertently. 
Searching a computer or GPS device requires a virtually indistinguishable 
process: scouring digital media to obtain incriminating virtual evidence.57 
 
                                                                                                                       
incriminating on its face”). 
53 United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013) aff’d Riley, 134 S.Ct. 2473 
(2014) (officers saw the cell phone’s caller ID screen and the “my house” label, in plain 
view, but had to open the phone to view Wurie’s call log). 
54 For examples of what constitutes “something more,” see Ariz. v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 
321, 324-25 (1987) (holding that the manipulation of equipment is unquestionably a 
separate search apart from the lawful and reasonable search for the shooter, victims, or 
weapons that were the lawful objective of the officer’s entry into the apartment); see 
also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000) (holding that an officer’s physical 
manipulation of a bus passenger’s bag violated his reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the inspection was more intrusive than purely visual inspection).  
55 The court in Galpin discussed whether the plain view doctrine applied in a case 
where a computer forensics analyst inadvertently observed images of child pornography 
after learning that the defendant accessed certain websites, knew there might be photos 
indicating same, and also knew that storage media might contain names and images of 
victims. The Court remanded for a determination on whether a search limited to evidence 
of a registration violation necessitates opening image and video files. Galpin, supra note 
51, at 444.  
56 Coolidge, supra note 25, at 466; Horton, supra note 53, at 135. 
57 Cf. United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The modern 
development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array 
of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a 
wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the (warrant) 
particularity requirement that much more important.”). 
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V.  THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST CONTEXT 
 
Absent a warrant, police officers must have some other justification to 
conduct a reasonable search; one such exception is the search incident to 
arrest doctrine.58 This doctrine normally implicates officer safety or 
evidence preservation rationales;59 however neither safety nor evidence 
apply in Alvarez because these defendants were not in the vehicle when the 
border patrol agents approached and did not pose a threat.60 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Wurie61 
decided the warrantless search of a suspect’s flip cell phone in the search 
incident to arrest context.62 That court held that although searching the 
suspect’s call log was less invasive than searching text messages, emails, or 
photographs, the search incident to arrest exception does not authorize the 
warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s 
person.63 Notwithstanding the need to preserve information from the call 
log that may be overridden by new calls or intentionally deleted, the court 
noted that the phone could be shut off, placed in a Faraday enclosure,64 the 
battery removed, or the contents mirrored to prevent technical wiping.65 
While the warrantless search of cell phones is unconstitutional without a 
                                                
58 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (concluding that circumstances involving 
automobiles justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence 
may be contained within the vehicle); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 767-68 (holding that 
when an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest and is appropriately 
limited in scope, it may be seized without a warrant). 
59 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (“The justification or reason for the authority to 
search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in 
order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for 
later use at trial.”) 
60 Alvarez, 8:13-cr-009, at 2-3. 
61 Affirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court, see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 2473, 
2479 (2014). 
62 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 15 (Howard, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 13. 
64 See Physical Evidence Bulletin, BUREAU FORENSIC SERVS., 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/cci/reference/peb_18.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) 
(directing officers to preserve digital evidence when a device is powered on by switching 
the device to “Airplane Mode” and placing it in a Faraday bag, which blocks wireless 
signals to the device thereby preventing the reception of calls and text messages while 
preserving the contents of the device without further manipulation); A faraday cage is a 
hollow enclosure of conducting material that is capable of blocking wave signals into and 
out of the enclosure. Calling a cell phone within the bag will result in immediately hearing 
a voicemail message. It is like an impenetrable prison for whatever the cage withholds. An 
example of a faraday cage is an anti-static bag, which can be purchased online for less than 
a dollar per unit online. Matthew French, Mobile Phone Faraday Cage (Nov. 25, 
2014), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1112.5495.pdf. 
65 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 11. 
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specific showing of exigent circumstances to search the phone 
immediately,66 like the imminent destruction of evidence located within, 
this reasoning must now also be extended to GPS devices. 
Under the circumstances of Alvarez, there are no time, safety, or 
preservation arguments that justify the officer’s search of the GPS device 
without a warrant. A GPS device can be placed in a Faraday enclosure the 
same way that a cell phone can. Furthermore, the comparison to paper maps 
fails to properly characterize the GPS device in a manner that reflects its 
technological capabilities. GPS devices do not implicate the same privacy 
concerns that other courts discussed because the device’s subject matter 
content is reserved exclusively to geography. However, this limited subject 
matter should not preclude protection for the information contained within 
these devices because the user still maintains an expectation of privacy; the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement must justify the officer’s actions in 
accordance with the device. 
 
VI.  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Today, most people with smart phones have access to GPS devices. 
Thus, the Supreme Court will inevitably confront the constitutionality issue 
of searching and seizing GPS devices, whether in the GPS device itself or 
as a collateral matter related GPS technology and cell phone searches. 
There is a distinction between attaching a GPS device to a vehicle to 
track its future whereabouts and obtaining a GPS device from a vehicle and 
searching its contents for previously traveled to destinations. The Supreme 
Court held in Jones that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle, then 
monitoring its movements on public streets constitutes a search under the 
fourth amendment.67 The Supreme Court did not address whether an officer 
is permitted to freely search a GPS device located within a suspect’s 
vehicle.68 
Future GPS technology will expand to newer devices. The distinction 
between a GPS device and a paper map lies in the ability to manipulate the 
GPS device to seek previously traveled to destinations, stored addresses, or 
even a current route programmed to a future destination. The GPS device 
certainly contains more information than an ordinary paper map, but the 
GPS device is limited in ways that a modern smart phone is not. While the 
illustrated complexity of the GPS device should defeat the paper map 
analogy, what remains unclear is whether a GPS device should be given the 
same treatment as a computer. Courts afford more protection to computers 
                                                
66 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
67 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012). 
68 Smith, supra note 14, at “Summary.” 
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because of the quantity and variety of information stored.69 The Supreme 
Court in Riley acknowledged that modern smart phones are themselves 
minicomputers that harness the abilities of a multitude of devices including, 
but not limited to cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape 
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, newspapers, and, of 
course, a telephone.70 Viewing GPS data on a cell phone has the potential to 
implicate other data within the phone, considering cell phone users operate 
their smart phones like personal computers.71 GPS software is already 
available within applications on smart phones,72 embedded within 
watches,73 and pre-installed within many technologically savvy 
automobiles.74 
                                                
69 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (hesitating to 
oversimplify fourth amendment doctrines in light of the realities of massive modern 
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74 GPS technology will eventually implicate widespread concerns regarding data 
collection and surveillance through pre-installed GPS devices built into 
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Car, N.Y. TIMES, BUSINESS DAY, Jan. 10, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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While similar cases involve searching a user’s cell phone, the Court 
must not limit its holding, but consider devices with similar capabilities 
including, but not limited to GPS devices, tablets, cell phones, and even 
mobile gaming consoles with internet access and storage functions. Rather, 
GPS data and smart phone technologies should be treated as corollary issues 
to resolve future disputes. Failing to delineate between GPS software and 
the devices themselves will give rise to inevitable litigation regarding the 
type of information accessed and whether the user possesses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the searched information. 
 
* * * 
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